UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported

Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

3-20-2013

State v. Sunday Respondent's Brief Dckt. 39169

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported
Recommended Citation
"State v. Sunday Respondent's Brief Dckt. 39169" (2013). Not Reported. 469.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/469

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please
contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAH
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
TESHA JOWANE SUNDAY,
Defendant-Appellant.

_____________

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

OPY

Nos.39169,39170
Canyon Co. Case No.
CR-2010-17716,
CR-2010-9431

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF CANYON

HONORABLE BRADLY S. FORD
District Judge

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
Attorney General
State of Idaho
PAUL R. PANTHER
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Criminal Law Division

SPENCER J. HAHN
Deputy State Appellate
Public Defender
3647 Lake Harbor Lane
Boise, Idaho 83703
(208) 334-2712

JOHN C. McKINNEY
Deputy Attorney General
Criminal Law Division
P.0. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
(208) 334-4534
ATTORNEYS FOR
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT

ATTORNEY FOR
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .............................................................................. ii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE .......................................................................... 1
Nature Of The Case .............................................................................. 1
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings ................... 1
ISSUES .............. :............................................................................................ 2
ARGUMENT .................................................................................................... 3
I.

II.

There Is Substantial Evidence In The Record To
Support The Jury's Verdicts Finding Sunday Guilty
Of Possession Of Methamphetamine And Possession
Of Drug Paraphernalia ............................................................... 3
A.

Introduction ...................................................................... 3

B.

Standard Of Review ........................................................ 3

C.

Substantial Evidence Supports The Jury's Verdict
That Sunday Had Constructive Possession Of
Methamphetamine And Drug Paraphernalia .................. .4

Sunday Has Failed To Show Error In The Jury lnstructions ..... 10
A.

lntroduction .................................................................... 10

B.

Standard Of Review ...................................................... 10

C.

Sunday Has Failed To Show The District Court
Erred By Refusing Her "Mere Proximity" Instruction ...... 11

D.

Sunday Has Failed To Show The District Court
Erred By Refusing To Give ICJI 305 On Union Or
Joint Operation Of Act And Intent.. ................................ 12

CONCLUSION ............................................................................................... 15
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ........................................................................ 15

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES

PAGE

Kuhnv. Proctor, 141 ldaho459, 111 P.3d 144(2005) .................................................. 14
McKay v. State, 148 Idaho 567, 225 P.3d 700 (2010) ................................................... 12
Statev. Blake, 133 Idaho 237,985 P.2d 117 (1999) ....................................................... 4
State v. Booton, 85 Idaho 51,375 P.2d 536 (1962) ...................................................... 13
State v. Bush, 131 Idaho 22, 951 P.2d 1249 (1997) ...................................................... 11
State v. Crawford, 130 Idaho 592, 944 P.2d 727 (Ct. App. 1997) ................................... 4
State v. Cuevas-Hernandez, 140 Idaho 373, 92 P.3d 704 (Ct. App. 2004) ................... 12
State v. Decker, 108 Idaho 683, 701 P .2d 303 (Ct. App. 1985) ..................................... .4
State v. Fox, 124 Idaho 924,866 P.2d 181 (1993) ........................................................ 13
State v. Gissel, 105 Idaho 287, 668 P.2d 1018 (Ct. App. 1983) ...................................... 4
State v. Hoffman, 137 Idaho 897, 55 P.3d 890 (Ct. App. 2002) .................................... 13
State v. Hoyle, 140 Idaho 679, 99 P.3d 1069 (2004) ................................................... 3, 4
Statev. Knutson, 121 Idaho 101,822 P.2d 998 (Ct. App. 1991) ................................. 3, 4
Statev. McMahan, 57 Idaho 240, 65 P.2d 156 (1937) .................................................. 13
State v. Miller, 131 Idaho 288, 955 P.2d 603 (Ct. App. 1997) ........................................ .4
State v. Parish, 79 Idaho 75, 310 P.2d 1082 (1957) ...................................................... 13
Statev. Reyes, 121 Idaho 570,826 P.2d 919 (Ct. App. 1992) ........................................ 3
Statev. Seitter, 127 Idaho 356,900 P.2d 1367 (1995) ................................................. 12
State v. Shackelford, 150 Idaho 355,247 P.3d 582 (2010) ........................................... 14
State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 77 P.3d 956 (2003) ................................................... 3
State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 923 P.2d 966 (1996) ................................................... 11

ii

STATUTES

I.C. § 37-2734A ............................................................................................................. 13

Ill

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Tesha Jowane Sunday appeals from her convictions by a jury for possession of a
controlled substance (methamphetamine) and possession of drug paraphernalia.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
As a result of a search warrant executed by the Caldwell Police Department on
Paul Reid's Caldwell, Idaho, residence in conjunction with a check forgery case, the
state charged Sunday with possession of methamphetamine, misdemeanor possession
of marijuana, and possession of drug paraphernalia. (R., pp.6, 46-47.) At trial, a jury
convicted Sunday of possession of methamphetamine and possession of drug
paraphernalia, but acquitted her of misdemeanor possession of marijuana. (R., pp.99100.) Sunday filed a motion for an order for a mistrial, or in the alternative, a motion for
a new trial (R., pp.107-119), which were both denied (R., pp.142-145, 152-176). The
district court sentence Sunday to a unified term of six years with two and one-half years
fixed, all suspended, and placed her on probation for six years.
Sunday timely appealed. (R., pp.197-200.)
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(R., pp.193-196.)

ISSUES
Sunday states the issues on appeal as follows:
1.

Was the evidence sufficient to support Ms. Sunday's conviction for
possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine)?

2.

Did the district court err in refusing to provide Ms. Sunday's requested jury
instructions?

(Appellant's Brief, p.5.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1. Is there substantial evidence in the record to support the jury's verdicts finding
Sunday guilty of possession of methamphetamine and possession of drug
paraphernalia?
2. Has Sunday failed to show any error in the district court's refusal to instruct the jury
as she requested?
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ARGUMENT
I.
There Is Substantial Evidence In The Record To Support The Jury's Verdicts Finding
Sunday Guilty Of Possession Of Methamphetamine And Possession Of Drug
Paraphernalia

A.

Introduction
Sunday argues on appeal that the jury's verdict finding her guilty of possession of

methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia was not supported by adequate evidence.
(Appellant's Brief, pp.6-11.) Sunday specifically claims "the State failed to establish that
[she] had knowledge of the presence of methamphetamine, let alone constructively
possessed it, that was discovered in a closed cigarette pack found in the master
bedroom of the house." (Appellant's Brief, p.6.) Sunday's argument fails because there
was substantial evidence presented at trial showing she possessed or constructively
possessed methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia.

B.

Standard Of Review
An appellate court will not set aside a judgment of conviction entered upon a jury

verdict if there is substantial evidence upon which a rational trier of fact could have
found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.

State v.

Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 285-86, 77 P.3d 956, 974-75 (2003); State v. Reyes, 121
Idaho 570, 826 P.2d 919 (Ct. App. 1992). The appellate court will not substitute its view
for that of the jury as to the credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be given to the
testimony, and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence.

State v.

Hoyle, 140 Idaho 679, 683-84, 99 P.3d 1069, 1073-74 (2004) (plurality); State v.
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Knutson, 121 Idaho 101,104,822 P.2d 998, 1001 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. Decker, 108
Idaho 683, 684, 701 P.2d 303, 304 (Ct. App. 1985).
In determining if the evidence is substantial and competent, it will be considered
in the light most favorable to the prosecution. State v. Miller, 131 Idaho 288, 292, 955
P.2d 603, 607 (Ct. App. 1997); Knutson, 121 Idaho at 104, 822 P.2d at 1001.
Substantial evidence is present when a "reasonable mind" could conclude that guilt was
proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Hoyle, 140 Idaho at 683-684, 99 P.3d at 10731074.

C.

Substantial Evidence Supports The Jury's Verdict That Sunday Had Constructive
Possession Of Methamphetamine And Drug Paraphernalia
An "appellate court's function is not to weigh and consider the contradictions and

inconsistencies which appellant finds in the testimony, but rather to determine whether
there is substantial evidence in support of the verdict of the jury, taking the view of the
evidence most favorable to the sustained party." State v. Gissel, 105 Idaho 287, 292,
668 P.2d 1018, 1023 (Ct. App. 1983). Actual possession requires possession and the
knowledge that one is in possession of the substance. State v. Blake, 133 Idaho 237,
240-241, 985 P.2d 117, 120-121 (1999).

Constructive possession "exists where a

nexus between the accused and the substance is sufficiently proven so as to give rise
to the reasonable inference that the accused was not simply a bystander but, rather,
had the power and intent to exercise dominion and control over the substance." State v.
Crawford, 130 Idaho 592, 595, 944 P.2d 727, 730 (Ct. App. 1997). Therefore, even if
there is no evidence directly showing that Sunday possessed methamphetamine, that
fact alone is not a basis for setting aside the jury's verdict.
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The relevant inquiry is

limited to whether there is substantial evidence in the record supporting the jury's
verdict that Sunday knew about the presence of the methamphetamine and pipe in the
Camel cigarette carton, and either had physical control of it or the power and intention
to exercise dominion and control over it. (See Tr., vol. 2, p.181, Ls.9-15; ICJI 421.) The
record reveals there was substantial evidence supporting the jury's verdict that Sunday
was guilty of possession of methamphetamine and possession of drug paraphernalia.
On April 6, 2010, at about 9:30 a.m., Caldwell Police Department officers
executed a search warrant upon the residence of Paul Reid in regarding to a check
forgery case. (Tr., vol. 1, p.125, L.18 - p.126, L.16; p.146, L.21 - p.147, L.12; p.197,
L.5 - p.198, L.18.) There were six or seven people in the residence, including Sunday,
when the officers entered the home. (Tr., vol. 1, p.208, Ls.2-4.) While other officers
searched the residence, Officer Brockbank spoke to Sunday as she sat on a couch in
the living room, and she told him that she had been staying in the master bedroom for a
few days, and when he asked her if she had any clothes or any items in the house, she
said she had some belongings in the master bedroom.

(Tr., vol. 1, p.200, L.6 - p.201,

L.1; p.205, Ls.12-15; p.209, Ls.14-16; p.215, L.25 - p.216, L.2; see State's Ex. 1
(showing what appears to be one or more items of female intimate apparel).) When
Officer Brockbank later went into the master bedroom, he saw some women's clothing
in the closet. (Tr., vol. 1, p.205, L.22 - p.206, L.11.) He also found a document (State's
Ex. 128) "hanging in the living room area, kind of common area of the house[,]" (Tr., vol.
2, p.72, Ls.2-7) which reads:
I am sorry 4 be a true homie.
(1)

everyone who is a close friend to me please listen up I'm sorry that
we keep butting heads.
5

(2)

Please forgive me for not wanting to get fuck on anything I do with
cash I just want to check.

(3)

Sorry I took you off the streets and helped you out cause im a nice
guy

(4)

Sorry be shearing all my cash, food, drugs, house and love with
you!

(5)

Sorry 4 giving a shit and every chance I get to make you smile and
happy!

(6)

Sorry 4 throwing you cash and the fucking helppen hand that made
us homie!
All because I take one fucking day to myself and
some new friend and you act like I killed your mom
Sorry but fuck you and get real and Im sorry

(State's Ex. 12B (verbatim).)
Detective Pittz searched the master bedroom, the master bedroom bathroom,
and the master bedroom closet.

(Tr., vol. 1, p.127, Ls.12-16.)

On the bed was a

woman's purse and a wallet sitting next to it with an Idaho Identification Card for 'Tesha
Sunday." (Tr., vol. 1, p.128, Ls.6-8; p.131, Ls.13-18; see State's Ex. 5.) There were
two fold-out camp type chairs sitting next to the bed with an end table in between them.
(Tr., vol. 1, p.128, L.13 - p.129, L.25; p.134, Ls.10-13; see State's Ex. 1.) In the cup
holder of one of the camp chairs was a Camel cigarette pack, about two feet from the
identification card, which contained a small bindle of methamphetamine and a pipe
similar to those commonly used to smoke methamphetamine. (Tr., vol. 1, p.128, L.13 p.130, L.17; p.134, Ls.10-13; vol. 2, p.34, L.10 - p.37, L.13; p.93, L.16 - p.94, L.2; see
State's Exs. 1, 4.) The pipe was a "blown glass pipe with a burnt portion of the bowl
and a white powdery residue on the inside of it." (Tr., vol. 2, p.74, Ls.13-15.) On the
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end table between the two camp chairs were two digital scales, which, according to
Detective Crupper, are the type "commonly used ... to weigh small quantities of illegal
narcotics." (Tr., vol. 1, p.129, Ls.10-25; p.222, L.18-p.223, L.7; see State's Exs. 2, 3.)
On a shelf in the master bedroom closet, Detective Pittz found what appeared to be
marijuana and "some pills." (Tr., vol. 1, p.134, Ls.1-9.)
Detective Pittz searched a drawer of a two-drawer dresser in the master
bedroom and found some court paperwork with Tesha Sunday's name on it, and a
"spoon that had some white residue on it in the same drawer as the paperwork." (Tr.,
vol. 1, p.128, Ls.9-12; p.138, Ls.16-21.) The spoon, which was "a measuring spoon, a
metal measuring spoon, teaspoon," subsequently tested negative for the presence of
methamphetamine and heroin. (Tr., vol. 2, p.40, L.22 - p.43, L.12; vol. 2, p.74, Ls.7-9;
p.155, L.18-p.156, L.10.)
Although Officer Brockbank testified that Beth Dinacola had been in the
bathroom of the master bedroom when the search began and later took responsibility
for "the meth pipe" (Tr., vol. 2, p.149, Ls.1-22), it was not established what meth pipe
she was referring to, as there were clearly at least two pipes located during the search;
Detective Crupper testified that his role during the search of Mr. Reid's home was to
secure the residence and take photographs, and he recalled taking photographs of at
least two glass pipes. (Tr., vol. 1, p.150, Ls.16-17; p.154, L.24- p.155, L.B.) According
to Officer Brockbank, three other people in the residence were charged with offenses.
(Tr., vol. 2, p.77, Ls.11-14.)
The defense called Paul Reid and Tyler Nourse as its only witnesses - both of
whom had prior convictions, and were in custody at the time of trial, for crimes of

7

dishonesty. (Tr., vol. 2, p.123, Ls.12-18; p.130, L.23 - p.131, L.1.) Paul Reid testified
that Sunday had been staying in the master bedroom with Hannibal Escobar, known as
"Monkey" (see Def s. Ex. A), for "about a week or so" before the search warrant was
served. (Tr., vol. 2, p.124, L.25 - p.125, L.24; p. 127, Ls.20-25.) He also stated that
Sunday smoked "Camel Crushes." (Tr., vol. 2, p.126, Ls.1-6.) Tyler Nourse, Sunday's
son, testified that the day of the search was the first day Sunday had stayed in the
master bedroom, but she wasn't really staying in that room, she was actually staying in
the living room.

(Tr., vol. 2, p.130, L.23 - p.131, L.11; p. 133, Ls.4-10.)

Nourse

explained that his mother's wallet was found on the master bedroom bed because he
had seen it in her often-borrowed Blazer, and took it from the vehicle and placed it on
the bed for safekeeping. (Tr., vol. 2, p.134, Ls.8-19.) In the following discourse, Nourse
contradicted Sunday's reported statement that she had been staying in the master
bedroom for a few days before the house was searched:
Q.

Are you aware that the - Miss Sunday admitted to living in that
room?

A.

No, sir.

Q.

Okay. Would that surprise you?

A.

No, sir.

Q.

Okay. Did she live in there, then?

A.

No.

Q.

Then why would she tell the officers that she lived there?

A.

I don't know.

(Tr., vol. 2, p.138, Ls.3-12.)
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In sum, there was substantial evidence to support the jury's finding that Sunday
was in possession, or constructive possession, of the methamphetamine and pipe found
in the Camel cigarette pick next to the bed in the master bedroom she was staying in,
including the following:
(a)

Sunday admitted she had been staying in that master bedroom for
a few days and that she had her belongings in that room;

(b)

the methamphetamine and pipe found inside the Camel cigarette
pack was about two feet from Sunday's purse, wallet, and
identification card on the bed;

(c)

According to Reid, Sunday smoked cigarettes, and although he
said she smoked Camel "Crunches," she reportedly smoked a subbrand of the same major brand of cigarettes (i.e., "Camel") that held
the methamphetamine and meth pipe;

(d)

a dresser drawer in the master bedroom contained Sunday's court
papers and a measuring spoon, which, although testing negative
for methamphetamine and heroin, had white residue on it;

(e)

Two other measuring devices -- digital scales -- were found on the
end table close to the bed Sunday was using;

(f)

women's intimate apparel is visible on the camp chair situated
between the bed and the Camel cigarette pack that held the meth
pipe and methamphetamine; and

(g)

in the "I am sorry" document, prominently posted in the living room
common area of the house, the author stated that he had been
sharing all his "cash, food, drugs, house and love" with the other
residents.

The testimony presented at trial provided substantial evidence whereby a jury
could have reasonably concluded

Sunday knew about the presence of the

methamphetamine and pipe in the Camel cigarette carton, and either had physical
control of the items or the power and intention to control them. Consequently, there is
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no basis for Sunday's contention that there was insufficient evidence to convict her of
those charges.

II.
Sunday Has Failed To Show Error In The Jury Instructions
A.

Introduction
Sunday contends that the district court erred by declining to give two of her

requested jury instructions. (Appellant's Brief, pp.11-15.) She contends that the court
erred by refusing to instruct the jury on (1) the principle that "mere proximity to
contraband cannot establish constructive possession," and (2) Idaho Criminal Jury
Instruction ("ICJI") 305 regarding the "union of act and intent." (Appellant's Brief, pp.1213.) Sunday's claims of instructional error are without merit.

First, the district court

correctly determined that Sunday was not entitled to a "mere proximity" instruction
because the latest version of ICJI 421 provides all the definition necessary for
distinguishing between actual and constructive possession and sole and joint
possession. Next, the district court properly used its discretion in refusing to instruct the
jury on ICJI 305 because to do so when one of the charges was a specific intent crime
would have confused the jury. Even if the court erred by refusing to give one or both of
the requested instructions, any such error was harmless.

B.

Standard Of Review
The standard of review applicable to a decision rendered by a district court in its

intermediate appellate capacity is set forth in Section I.B., supra, and is incorporated
herein by reference. Whether the jury instructions, when considered as a whole, fairly
and adequately present the issues and state the applicable law is a question of law over
10

which the appellate court exercises free review. State v. Bush, 131 Idaho 22, 32, 951
P.2d 1249, 1259 (1997); State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 923 P.2d 966,971 (1996).

C.

Sunday Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred By Refusing Her "Mere
Proximity" Instruction
In denying Sunday's request to have the jury instructed that mere proximity to a

controlled substance is not sufficient to prove possession, the district court explained:
I'm giving the instruction on the possession of a controlled substance for
both the marijuana and the meth. And I've reviewed those comments.
I've also reviewed the definition of possession contained in the new IDJI
[sic] 421, which cites State versus Seitter, S-E-1-T-T-E-R, 127 Idaho 356,
which apparently is an Idaho Supreme Court case which says, "there is no
need to attempt to distinguish further between actual and constructive
possession and sole or joint possession." And that case was decided
subsequent to any of the three cases that you have cited in your
requested instructions. Those are at 1980 - 1993, 1989 and 1987,
whereas, the Seitter case is 1995, apparently an Idaho Supreme Court
case.
So I will note your objection, and I'm going to decline to give those
instructions.
(Tr., vol. 2, p.175, L.22 - p. 176, L.13.) Sunday's trial counsel stated that the case he
was relying upon to explain constructive possession was a 1997 case (Tr., vol. 2, p.176,
Ls.17-19), and the court responded that, inasmuch as the Supreme Court promulgated
new criminal jury instructions on September 1, of 2010, "those are the instructions that
the Court is going to give." (Tr., vol. 2, p.176, Ls.20-25.) The court was correct to do
so.

The district court correctly observed that the latest version of the Idaho Criminal
Jury Instructions went into effect on September 1, 2010. (See ICJI, Order of Aug. 26,
2010 by Chief Justice Daniel T. Eismann.) As the court related, one of the comments to
ICJI 421 reads, "There is no need to attempt to distinguish further between actual and
11

constructive possession and sole and joint possession[,]" citing State v. Seitter, 127
Idaho 356,900 P.2d 1367 (1995). (Tr., vol. 2, p.176, Ls.20-25; ICJI 421.) Although ICJI
421 does not state that mere presence is not enough to find a person in "possession" of
a controlled substance, it sets out what is required, as follows:
A person has possession of something it the person knows of its
presence and has physical control of it, or has the power and intention to
control it. More than one person can be in possession of something if
each knows of its presence and has the power and intention to control it.
ICJI 421 (see Tr., vol. 2, p.181, Ls.9-15).

The pattern ICJI instructions are

presumptively correct. State v. Cuevas-Hernandez, 140 Idaho 373, 376, 92 P.3d 704,
707 (Ct. App. 2004); McKay v. State, 148 Idaho 567, 571 n.2, 225 P.3d 700, 704 n.2
(2010) (citations omitted). By requiring proof that a person both know of a controlled
substance's presence and have physical control (or the power and intention to control
it), ICJI 421 makes it clear that a defendant's mere presence is not enough to prove
possession.

Sunday has failed to show any error in the district court's following the

most recent rendition of ICJI 421, and its comment that no further definition is
necessary.

D.

Sunday Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred By Refusing To Give ICJI
305 On Union Or Joint Operation Of Act And Intent
During the jury instruction hearing, Sunday asked the district court to instruct the

jury according to ICJI 305, which states (as applied here), "In every crime or public
offense there must exist a union or joint operation of act and intent." (Tr., vol. 2, p.170,
L.13 - p.172, L.4.) The court first noted that the comments to ICJI 305 indicate it is only
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applicable to general intent crimes, 1 and one of the crimes charged - possession of
drug paraphernalia - is a specific intent crime.2 (Id.) The court then declined to give
the requested instruction, and explained, "one of the charges is a specific intent crime
and the Court believes it would be confusing and misleading to the jury." (Tr., vol. 2,
p.172, Ls.8-13.)
Not only was the district court correct to point out that the "union/joint operation"
instruction might have confused the jury in regard to the misdemeanor charge of
possession of drug paraphernalia, in this situation it would also have confused the jury
in its consideration of whether Sunday constructively possessed the methamphetamine
found in the Camel cigarette pack in the master bedroom. The court properly instructed
the jury (in relevant part), "A person has possession of something if the person knows of
its presence and has physical control of it, or has the power and intention to control it."

1

The Comment to ICJI 305 explains:
The word "intent" does not mean an intent to commit a crime but merely
the intent to knowingly perform the interdicted act, or by criminal
negligence the failure to perform the required act. State v. Parish, 79
Idaho 75, 310 P.2d 1082 (1957); State v. Booton, 85 Idaho 51, 375 P.2d
536 (1962). The term "criminal negligence", means gross negligence,
such as amounts to reckless disregard of consequences and the rights of
others. State v. McMahan, 57 Idaho 240, 65 P.2d 156 (1937) (construing
former I.C. s 17 114 which was identical to s 18 114).
This instruction is unnecessary when the crime charged requires a specific
mental element and the jury is properly instructed regarding that mental
element. State v. Hoffman, 137 Idaho 897, 55 P.3d 890 (Ct. App. 2002).

Possession of a controlled substance is a general intent crime, "that is, the knowledge
that one is in possession of the substance[,]" not that the substance was illegal. State v.
Fox, 124 Idaho 924, 926, 866 P.2d 181, 183 (1993). In contrast, I.C. § 37-2734A
makes it "unlawful for any person to use, or to possess with intent to use, drug
paraphernalia to . . . ingest, inhale or otherwise introduce into the human body a
controlled substance."
2
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(Tr., vol. 2, p.181, Ls.9-12 (emphasis added).) The "intent" (or knowledge) requirement
of possession of a controlled substance is that the "person knows of its presence."
When the possession is by "physical control," then that is the "act" that must be in
"union or joint operation" with the intent.

However, where, as here, "constructive

possession" is the basis for the offense, the "act" includes "intent" language - i.e.,
having "the power and intention to control it" -- that could easily confuse a jury
attempting to decide if there "exist[sJ a union or joint operation of act and intent."
Moreover, the district court's instruction that a person has possession of something "if
the person knows of its presence and has . .. the power and intention to control it" (Tr.,
vol. 2, p.181, Ls.9-12 (emphasis added)) strongly suggests that the act and intent must
occur simultaneously. Sunday has failed to show that the district court erred in refusing
to instruct the jury on ICJI 305.
Even if the district court erred in refusing to give ICJI 305, for the same reasons
set forth above, and in reviewing the instructions as a whole, such an error would not
have misled the jury or prejudiced Sunday's case. State v. Shackelford, 150 Idaho 355,
373-74, 247 P.3d 582, 600-01 (2010) (citing Kuhn v. Proctor, 141 Idaho 459, 462, 111
P.3d 144, 147 (2005) ("An erroneous instruction will not constitute reversible error
unless the instructions as a whole misled the jury or prejudiced a party.")
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CONCLUSION
The state requests this Court to affirm Sunday's convictions for possession of a
controlled substance (methamphetamine) and possession of drug paraphernalia.
DATED this 20 th day of March, 20 3.

J HN C. McKINN Y
Deputy Attorney General
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